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INTRODUCTION

In recent years, an increasing number of commentators have begun
to express doubts about the effectiveness of the tort system.! According
to these critics, tort law does not deter accidents,2 nor does it spread accident costs efficiently.3 Worst of all, the tort system is extremely expensive to operate.4 Some of this criticism has spilled over into the products
liability area.5 Products liability law has been condemned as expensive,6
iheffective,1 and regressive;8 in addition, it has been blamed for higher
product prices,9 foreign competition,!O problems within the liability insur1. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Encouraging Safety: The Limits of Tort Law and Government
Regulation, 33 VAND. L. REv. 1281, 1317 (1980) ("It is hard to conjure up a system of accident cost
control more irrational and less reflective of social values than the present tort system."); Stephen D.
Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 555, 616-17 (1985) ("My judgment is that
the mammoth social costs of ordinary tort law, importantly including the socially undesirable behavior prompted by tort law, outweigh its benefits.").
2. See Steven D. Smith, The Critics and the "Crisis": A Reassessment of the Current Conceptions of Tort Law, 72 CoRNEll. L. REv. 765, 775 (1987) ("[T]he argument that tort law can allocate
to injurers the correct costs of injuries and thereby prompt the correct level of safety investment
seems manifestly implausible.").
3. See Sugarman, supra note I, at 592-96 (arguing that compensation under tort law is both
overinclusive and underinclusive).
4. See John G. Fleming, Is There a Future for Tort?, 44 LA. L. REv. 1193, 1207 (1984) ("The
most formidable criticism that can be levied against the tort system is its inordinate expense. ");
Sugarman, supra note I, at 596 ("[T]he tort system is fabulously expensive to operate in comparison
to modem compensation systems.").
5. See Carl T. Bogus, War on the Common Law: The Struggle at the Center of Products Liability, 60 Mo. L. REv. I, 5 (1995) ("The literature overflows with criticism, and anyone perusing the
law reviews in recent years might well come away believing that the predominant view is that products liability has been a disaster."); William Powers, Jr., A Modest Proposal to Abandon Strict Products Liability, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 639, 639 ("Current products liability law is a mess. Its foundation is flawed, its content is exceedingly complex, and its effect on personal injury litigation is
pernicious.").
6. See Gregory C. Jackson, Comment, Pharmaceutical Product Liability May Be Hazardous to
Your Health: A No-Fault Alternative to Concurrent Regulation, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 199, 233 (1992)
("Strict liability thus creates excessive administrative or transactional costs in the form of litigation
expenses .•.. ").
7. See Powers, supra note 5, at 644 ("It is debatable, both analytically and empirically,
whether strict liability increases product safety, much less whether it tends to optimize product
safety.") (emphasis removed).
8. See George L. Priest, Modem Tort Law and Its Reform, 22 VAL. U. L. REv. I, 17 (1987)
(describing the regressive effects of damage rules in products liability on low-income consumers);
Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE LJ. 353,
405-06 (1988) (describing the same phenomenon).
9. See Tun Moore, Comment, Comment K Immunity To Strict Liability: Should Prescription
Drugs Be Protected?, 26 Hous. L. REv. 707, 718 (1989) ("Only two manufacturers of DTP vaccine
remain in the market, and the cost of each dose rose from 11 cents in 1982 to $11.40 in 1986, $8 of
which was for an insurance reserve.").
10. See William A. Worthington, The "Citadel" Revisited: Strict Tort Liability and the Policy
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ance industry, II corporate bankruptcies,12 lack of product development, 13
and the removal of useful products from the market. 14
Much of the problem appears to lie with the concept of enterprise liability, which has provided the intellectual foundation for strict products
liability for more than thirty years. IS The theory of enterprise liability assumes that product sellers are always in the best position to prevent injuries and to spread accident costs.1 6 However, not only is this proposition
often untrue, but it has encouraged courts to invent new remedies for
consumers and to impose new duties on producers whenever a new liability issue has arisen. 17 Although the courts have not yet imposed absoof Law, 36 S. TEx. L. REv. 227, 245 (1995) ("While not the sole culprit, strict tort liability has been
a significant contributor to the decline in competitiveness of American industry.").
11. See Kenneth S. Abraham et aI., Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury: Further Reflections, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 333, 338 (1993) ("Some features operating within the tort system,
however, appear to aggravate the problem of unaffordable (or unavailable) insurance coverage.");
Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty Mahshigian, A Permanent Solution for Product Liability Crises: Uniform Federal Tort Law Standards, 64 DENY. U. L. REv. 685, 686 (1988) ("Dramatic and unpredictable changes in tort law rules have made it difficult, if not impossible, for insurers to accurately
price various classes of liability insurance.").
12. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Taking Advantage of the Torts Crisis, 48 Owo ST. LJ. 329,
335-36 (1987) ("In fact, in some mass tort situations, the amounts of money sought and likely to be
awarded are so great as to threaten to exhaust both the liability insurance and the underlying capital
of the defendant enterprises.").
13. See PETER W. HUBER, LIABlLlTY:
LEGAL REvOumON AND ITS CoNSEQUENCES 155-161
(1988); C. Boyden Gray, Regulation and Federalism, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 93, 97 (1983) ("Because
manufacturers cannot predict the standards by which their products will be judged, they may be reluctant to introduce new designs or innovative products."); Note, A Question of Competence: The
Judicial Role in the Regulation of Pharmaceuticals, 103 HARv. L. REv. 773, 775 (1990) ("[L]iability
fears may inhibit the development of drugs in the first instance by skewing research and development incentives away from fields that contain a high background risk of untoward effects.").
14. See W. KIP VISCUSI. REFORMING PRODUcrs LIABlLlTY 8 (1991) (arguing that tort liability
costs caused production of private airplanes to fall from 17,000 to 1,085); Pennington Landen, Federal Preemption and the Drug Industry: Can Courts Co-Regulate?, 43 FOOD DRUG CoSM. W. 85,
119 (1988) ("In addition to chilling new remedies, litigation has already forced some manufacturers
to remove useful products from the marlcet. ").
15. See generally George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of
the Intellectual Foundations of Modem Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985) (discussing the role
of enterprise liability during the formative years of products liability).
16. See Howard C. Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts, 417 u. CoLO. L. REv.
153, 159 (1976).
17. See, e.g., Jordan v. Sunnyslope Appliance Propane & Plumbing Supplies Co., 660 P.2d
1236, 1242 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (extension of strict liability found appropriate for sellers of used
products because of their superior ability to "shift losses, distribute costs, or insure against losses");
Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 936 (Cal. 1980) (imposing market-share liability on pharmaceutical companies because "[t]he manufacturer is in the best position to discover and guard against
defects in its products and to warn of harmful effects"); Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 8-9 (Cal.
1977) (holding that subjecting successor corporations to liability for defective products manufactured
by their predecessors was based on "the successor's ability to assume the original manufacturer's

nm
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lute liability on product sellers, this steady expansion of liability has now
reached the point where the entire system of products liability is in danger of collapsing under the weight of excessive producer liability. IS
This has led some reformers to recommend that the existing products liability regime be modified or replaced by a different system. Proposals have ranged from ingenious neo-contractual arrangements 19 to
comprehensive social insurance programs.20 One such alternative, which
will be examined in greater detail below, is to replace the existing system of products liability with a statutory compensation scheme based on
insurance principles. This approach assumes that consumers who buy a
product also purchase protection against product-related injuries. In return
risk-spreading" function); Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn. 1980) (approving of punitive damages in strict liability cases because manufacturers have "virtually exclusive
access to much of the information necessary for effective control of dangers facing product consumers"); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 549 (NJ. 1982) (imposition of liability
on product sellers for unknowable risks justified on the grounds that it will increase product safety
research and spare victims "the burdensome financial consequences of unfit products"); Cintrone v.
Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 212 A.2d 769, 778 (NJ. 1965) (extending strict liability to
bailor because bailor's expertise "ought to put him in a better position than the bailee to detect or to
anticipate flaws or defects or fatigue in his vehicles").
18. See VISCUSI, supra note 14, at 8 (discussing the adverse effect of tort liability on the production of private airplanes); Louis Lasagna, The Chilling Effect of Product Liability on New Drug
Development, in THE LIABn.ITY MAzE: THE IMPACf OP LIABn.ITY LAw ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION
334, 334-48 (peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991) [hereinafter THE LIABILITY MAzE]
(describing the adverse effect of products liability on research and development efforts within the
pharmaceutical industry); George L. Priest, Puzzles of the Tort Crisis, 48 OHIO ST. LJ. 497, 500
(1987) [hereinafter Priest, Puzzles of the Tort Crisis] (stating that the threat of tort liability caused
many products to be taken off the market); George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Mod- '
em Tort Law, 96 YALE W. 1521, 1550-63 (1987) [hereinafter Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis]
(describing how increasing tort liability has made it difficult for product manufacturers to obtain liability insurance at reasonable cost); W. Kip VIScusi, Wading Through the Muddle of Risk-Utility
Analysis, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 573, 588 (1990) (observing that liability imposed by tort law bankrupted
the asbestos industry).
19. See, e.g., Jeffrey O'Connell, Balanced Proposals for Product Liability Refonn, 48 OHIO ST.
W. 317, 322-28 (1987) [hereinafter O'Connell, Balanced Proposals] (proposing that product sellers
be allowed to avoid tort claims by offering periodic payment of claimant's net economic loss); Jeffrey O'Connell, A "Neo No-Fault" Contract in Lieu of Tort: Preaccident Guarantees of Postaccident
Settlement Offers, 73 CAL. L. REv. 898, 906-10 (1985) [hereinafter O'Connell, A "Neo No-Fault"
Contract] (proposing a scheme by which product sellers and providers of services can avoid litigation by warranting to tender compensation for victim's net economic injury within 9{) days regardless
of the existence of tort liability); Jeffrey O'Connell, An Immediate Solution to Some Products Liability Problems: Workers' Compensation as a Sole Remedy for Employees, with an Employer's Remedy
Against Third Parties, 1976 INs. LJ. 683, 685-87 (proposing to limit claims of injured workers to
workers compensation benefits and to prohibit them from suing product sellers or suppliers).
20. See, e.g., Sugannan, supra note I, at 642-51 (proposing that tort law, including products
liability, be replaced by a combination of increased government regulation and compensation programs to cover disability and medical expenses).
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for a "premium," which is reflected in the price of the product, the
product seller agrees to compensate the consumer on a no-fault basis for
certain types of product-related losses. Under such an arrangement, therefore, payments made by product sellers to accident victims are considered indemnification payments rather than damage awards. This perspective opens up many avenues that are foreclosed under the traditional
enterprise liability rationale of products liability. For example, by rejecting enterprise liability, it is no longer necessary to design a products
liability regime which must balance product safety and compensation
goals; instead, the system can focus solely on providing compensation to
accident victims at the cheapest cost
In this article, I examine an approach under which product sellers
would be obligated to reimburse injured consumers on a no-fault basis
for economic losses and nothing more. This arrangement promises to be
less complicated and cheaper to administer than the present products liability system. The article is divided into four parts. Part IT analyzes the
concept of enterprise liability and the assumptions that underlie it: (1)
that consumers need protection against the superior knowledge and economic power of product manufacturers; (2) that strict liability will encourage manufacturers to optimize product safety; and (3) that manufacturers are better able than consumers to spread product-related losses.21
However, I fmd that all of these assumptions are suspect and, therefore,
conclude that enterprise liability does not really provide a credible foundation for products liability.
Part ill considers whether products liability can be conceptualized as
a fonn of insurance. First, I examine the traditional theory which some
commentators rely upon as a rationale for the existing system of products
liability. I conclude that it is impossible to reconcile first-party insurance
principles with the system of open-ended liability that prevails under
products liability law. However, I also find that the insurance rationale
will support a more modest compensation scheme under which producer
liability is limited to net economic losses.
Part IV identifies a number of characteristics that one would expect
to find in a coherent insurance-based compensation scheme for productrelated injuries. These features include: (1) a strong regulatory compliance defense in design defect and failure to warn cases; (2) elimination
of awards for nonpecuniary damages; (3) exclusion of punitive damage
21. See Stephen P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case for
Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L. REv. 683, 706 (1993).
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awards; (4) limitations on the doctrine of joint and several liability; (5)
prohibition of suits against product sellers by employees who have already received workers compensation awards; and (6) abolition of the
collateral source rule in products liability cases.
Finally, Part V addresses some additional issues that are relevant to
the adoption of an insurance-based compensation scheme. One such issue
is whether the implementation of an insurance-based compensation mechanism would adversely affect product safety. A second consideration is
whether switching from the present products liability regime to one based
on insurance principles would have undesirable distributional effects. Another concern is how attorneys' fees will be paid if damage awards are
drastically reduced. A fourth issue is whether principles of comparative
fault should be applied in products liability litigation. Yet another topic
for discussion is whether product sellers should be allowed to increase or
decrease their liability through the use of warranties and disclaimers. Finally, there is the question of whether an insurance-based scheme should
be implemented at the state or the federal level.
II. ENTERPRISE

LIABILITY

As A RATIONALE FOR PRODUcrS

LIABILITY

The theory of enterprise liability provides that businesses that engage in activities which impose risks on others ought to compensate
those who are injured.22 This theory is grounded on principles of fairness23 and economic efficiency.24 In the 1960's and 1970's, enterprise lia22. See Fleming James, Jr., An Evaluation of the Fault Concept, 32 TENN. L. REv. 394, 399400 (1965) ("This point of view, which may be called enterprise liability, is most simply stated by
the proposition that an activity •.. should pay for the accident loss it causes because, as a general
proposition, each enterprise in our society should pay its own way."); Klemme, supra note 16, at
158 ("In its broadest terms the theory of enterprise liability in torts is that losses to society created
or caused by an enterprise or, more simply, by an activity, oUght to be borne by that enterprise or
activity."); Priest, supra note IS, at 463 ("This conception, which its proponents called the theory of
enterprise liability, provides in its simplest form that business enterprises ought to be responsible for
losses resulting from products they introduce into commerce.").
23. See Fleming James, Jr., Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance,
57 YALE LJ. 549, 550 (1948) ("If a certain type of loss is the more or less inevitable by-product of
a desirable but dangerous form of activity it may well be just to distribute such losses among all the
beneficiaries of the activity though it would be unjust to visit them severally upon those individuals
who had happened to be the faultless instruments causing them.").
24. See James, supra note 22, at 400 ("The proposition that an enterprise should pay its way
has been defended on general considerations of fairness and on the economist's argument that this
leads to a proper allocation of limited' resources in a free society."); Gary J. Highland, Note, Sales of
Defective Used Products: Should Strict Liability Apply?, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 80S, 813 (1979) ("Enterprise liability in the form of strict products liability tends to optimize the allocation of resources by
forcing businesses to include, as part of the cost of doing business, the costs of injuries caused by
defects in products that they sell.").
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